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Abstract
Protein Folding is concerned with the reasons and mechanism behind a protein’s tertiary
structure. The thermodynamic hypothesis of Anfinsen postulates an universal energy function
(UEF) characterizing the tertiary structure, defined consistently across proteins, in terms of
their aminoacid sequence.
We consider the approach of examining multiple protein structure descriptors in the PDB
(Protein Data Bank), and infer individual preferences, biases favoring particular classes of
aminoacid interactions in each of them, later aggregating these individual preferences into
a global preference. This 2-step process would ideally expose intrinsic biases on classes of
aminoacid interactions in the UEF itself. The intuition is that any intrinsic biases in the UEF
are expressed within each protein in a specific manner consistent with its specific aminoacid
sequence, size, and fold (consistently with Anfinsen’s thermodynamic hypothesis), making a
1-step, holistic aggregation less desirable.
Our intention is to illustrate how some impossibility results from voting theory would apply
in this setting, being possibly applicable to other protein folding problems as well. We consider
concepts and results from voting theory and unveil methodological difficulties for the approach
mentioned above. With our observations, we intend to highlight how key theoretical barriers,
already exposed by economists, can be relevant for the development of new methods, new
algorithms, for problems related to protein folding.
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1 Introduction
The systematic aggregation of individual preferences into a global social preference is the princi-
pal concern of social choice theory. Its origins trace back to the 13th-century, when the philosopher
Ramon Lull considered a voting method that counted pairwise preferences among candidates. This
technique was later recovered by the famous 18th-century mathematicians Borda and Condorcet.
Later, in 1951, Kenneth Arrow stated his famous impossibility theorem ([3], for the version of 1963),
which is viewed as a landmark of social choice theory. This important result defines apparently
innocuous properties that certain preference aggregation functions (called social welfare functions)
should respect, but also demonstrates that such properties are conflicting.
Many other impossibility results followed. The conclusions usually result from an axiomatic
setting, where aggregation functions are modeled after axioms defining their intended behavior.
Also common is the relative unconcern for the elements subject to preferences. Many aggregation
settings, in addition, do not consider voters as players, but merely as providers of information –
and we are interested on those settings only. Note that the observations above suggest a potential
application of the impossibility results to other circumstances that involve aggregation. In this
work, we model a problem related to protein folding as an aggregation function prone to those
impossibility results, exploring the connection between these ideas.
The protein folding problem is basically interested on how and why proteins settle in particular
three-dimensional structures. The well-accepted thermodynamic hypothesis of Anfinsen [2] states
that the protein structure, informally speaking, is a unique, stable, and viable state depending solely
on aminoacid sequence. The state minimizes an energy function accounting for physiochemical
utilities. Such universal energy function (UEF) is defined consistently across proteins, in terms of
the particular aminoacid interactions that define each of them.
The protein folding literature often takes a holistic approach to analyzing the PDB [1] in order to
obtain certain conclusions from stable folds. We define a problem related to protein folding where
a 2-step aggregation process will seem more intuitive: suppose we intend to infer hypothesized
intrinsic preferences on the UEF, which would favor certain classes of aminoacid interactions over
others. The idea is to first aggregate multiple individual preferences, and later consolidate them
into a single global preference. In other words, we consider and explore the following scenario:
• Say that the UEF has an intrinsic global preference among interaction classes. For instance,
the UEF might generally favor (A,V ), the interaction of the aminoacids alanine and valine,
over (G,L), the interaction of aminoacids glycine and leucine.
• This global preference is manifested distinctly across proteins, in light of the thermodynamic
hypothesis. In other words, a protein’s stable fold implies an individual preference among
interaction classes, which results from its corresponding aminoacid sequence and the global
preference intrinsic to the UEF.
We consider the possibility of inferring or estimating the postulated global preference among
interaction classes, intrinsic to the UEF, by aggregating individual preferences, extracted separately
from multiple stable folds in the PDB. We assess and qualify aminoacid interactions inside each
protein in order to generate the individual preferences. Importantly, we assume that aminoacid
interactions are totally defined by pairwise interactions (see Sec. 2.2). The existence and expression
of a pairwise interaction depends on the aminoacids involved (their physiochemical affinities) and
their spacial arrangement (their distance and contact).
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We particularly think that such 2-step aggregation process is particularly sensible in light of
Anfinsen’s thermodynamic hypothesis. The idea is that individual proteins may express universal
biases differently, according to their particular aminoacid sequence, size, and fold (note here the
thermodynamic hypothesis). If we holistically analyze the PDB, performing instead a 1-step ag-
gregation process, we effectively aggregate over aminoacid interactions from multiple proteins. By
assumption, those aminoacid interactions may express biases differently. This argument might as
well be applicable to other problems related to protein folding where the thermodynamic hypothesis
is considered.
The problem formalized before is formally weaker than those aiming for more complete charac-
terizations of the UEF with our 2-step aggregation process and the same axiomatic setting. Here,
while we do not intend to completely characterize the UEF, we do intend to identify intrinsic biases
among interaction classes in the UEF. Unfortunately, this weaker problem will still manifest an
impossibility in light of some seemingly reasonable assumptions (discussed in Sec. 2 and Sec. 4).
Stronger characterizations of the UEF via the method above will suffer from similar methodological
limitations unless axioms are relaxed, made more specific, or otherwise changed appropriately.
Our intention and contribution is to highlight theoretical impossibility results for the problem
considered above, under reasonable assumptions (see Sec. 4). We use concepts and results from
voting theory, a distinct investigation field of social choice theory, in Economics. The goal is to
sparkle interest in the profound results from voting theory, and highlight a connection of this
area with methods that, so far, have been mainly a concern of biologists, chemists, physicists,
and computer scientists. We note that the remarks made here result from a suitable axiomatic
framework, from the application of voting theory concepts, and from direct reduction to previous
results in this area. We intend to suggest how some key theoretical barriers, already exposed by
economists, can be relevant for the development of new methods, new algorithms, for problems
related to protein folding, particularly those in which the thermodynamic hypothesis is considered.
2 The Analytic Framework
In this section, we present the axioms and definitions that form our analytic framework. We
adhere to the thermodynamic principle of [2], and further assume that aminoacid interactions in the
universal energy function are totally defined by pairwise interactions. We try to abstract concepts
of purely biological nature as much as possible. Again, the purpose is to bring impossibility results
from voting theory to our 2-step preference model and suggest that they might be relevant to other
problems related to protein folding.
2.1 Thermodynamic Hypothesis
There are two principal questions in the Protein Folding research [9]. The first one concerns
the reasons why proteins settle in a specific tertiary structure. The second asks how to correctly
predict the tertiary structure given the protein’s aminoacid configuration.
The thermodynamic hypothesis [2] says that the tertiary structure results solely from aminoacid
interactions, maximizing a function of utility character and physiochemical nature. Also, the final
structure is (1) unique, as other possible states have strictly lower energy; (2) stable, as small
external changes do not disrupt the structure; and (3) viable, smoothly accessible by physiochemical
changes.
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Axiom 2.1. The thermodynamic hypothesis of [2] is valid, hence the protein’s tertiary structure is
unique, stable, viable, and depends solely on aminoacid interactions.
2.2 Pairwise Interactions
Previous literature suggests energy functions depending on number, distance, and additional
physiochemical properties (hydrophobia/hydrophilia, among others) between pairs of aminoacids
in the three-dimensional protein structure [11, 17, 13]. We will follow such approach, hence pairwise
interactions fully characterize our aminoacid interactions in this work.
Identifying pairwise interactions instead of trying to obtain all collective, grouped interactions
is much more viable computationally. Besides, it is conceivable that more intricate interaction
patterns be extrapolated from pairwise interactions. In this work, we consider pairwise energy
functions, i.e., those totally defined by energy potentials on pairwise interactions among aminoacids.
Axiom 2.2 (Pairwise Hypothesis). All existent information on aminoacid interactions can be
obtained by considering only pairwise interactions.
2.2.1 Interaction Classes and Instances
An interaction class is a pair (X1,X2) where X1 and X2 are names of aminoacids. For instance,
(A,V ) is the interaction of the aminoacids alanine and valine, and (G,L) is the interaction of
aminoacids glycine and leucine. We consider (X1,X2) equal to (X2,X1) for any aminoacid names
X1,X2. Considering the standard 20 aminoacids that characterize proteins, we have 380 possible
interactions classes.
Within a protein’s stable fold, an interaction instance of (X1,X2) occurs if the distance between
two aminoacids of types X1 and X2, is within an arbitrary threshold τ . In practice, the distance
could be taken over heavy atoms, centroids in aminoacids, or cα locations in aminoacids (the
location of the central carbon atom). Our results are independent of the choice above. We represent
interaction classes with uppercase letters (e.g. I), and interaction instances with lowercase letters
(e.g. i). In a protein’s stable fold P , the interaction instances of the interaction class I defines the
set InstP (I).
Establishing a distance threshold might seem arbitrary and even unrealistic, as overlooking
interaction instances that barely fail such distance may discard useful information. Also, whatever
account attributed to interaction instances must also consider certain physiochemical properties,
for instance, hydrophobia or hydrophilia1, usually compiled into tables such as the Miyazawa-
Jernigan [13]. One could argue that the right choice of distance threshold and tables describing
physiochemical interactivity could be enough to totally define the UEF. Let us fix (yet not specify) τ
big enough as to accommodate all possible actual aminoacid interactions, and assume that contacts
are scored accordingly.
Therefore, to each interaction instance i, we associate an energetic score e(i) ∈ R, which ab-
stracts the following parameters: (1) distance threshold τ ; (2) contact point; (3) the physiochemical
properties of the aminoacids involved. As far as identifying intrinsic preferences over interaction
classes in the UEF, our results are independent of the above choices – in other words, independent
of the energetic score function. The key to such generality of results lies in our 2-step preference
model, in our axiomatic setting, and impossibility results from voting theory.
1Respectively, the tendency or aversion to bind to water.
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3 Internal Aggregation
The internal aggregation is the procedure where the energetic scores of the interaction instances
are taken into account and define a protein’s individual preference. For any protein P :
• Each interaction instance i has an energetic score e(i) ∈ R modeling distance threshold,
contact point, and physiochemical properties of i. The function e() is fixed yet arbitrary.
The value of e(i) can be positive or negative, modeling physiochemical properties that might
manifest with opposing effect (for instance, hydrophobia vs. hydrophilia).
• Each interaction class I has a set of interaction instances InstP (I). The individual preference
of P regarding I1 versus I2 depends only on InstP (I1) and InstP (I2), and the energetic scores
respectively associated with each interaction instance. We consider two scenarios:
1. For each interaction instance I, we can infer an utility value uP (I) ∈ R, completely
defined in terms of InstP (I). Considering the same protein/function, the utilities are
comparable: if uP (I1) > uP (I2), then P manifests preference (i.e., bias) for I1 instead of
I2; if uP (I1) = uP (I2), then P does not manifest any preference (i.e., bias) for I1 instead
of I2.
Note that we do not assume comparability between utility levels across two different
proteins. This is what characterizes our 2-step preference model: utilities are meaningful
to its corresponding protein only. In Sec. 4.4 we in fact vary the comparability between
utility levels across proteins, and explore the consequences of each mode.
2. We can only infer a total order P among interaction classes, completely defined in
terms of InstP (I1) and InstP (I2). If I1 ≻P I2, then P prefers I1 to I2; if I1 ≺P I2, then
P prefers I2 to I1; if I1 =P I2, then P is indifferent regarding I1 versus I2.
We call the first scenario the utility preference model, and the second scenario is an ordinal
preference model (our terminology). We examine the two scenarios separately, in each case we
apply the appropriate concepts and impossibility results from social choice theory. Recapitulating,
our goal is to evaluate the viability of the following strategy:
Internal Aggregation: Examine interaction instances of each protein, deriving the manifested
individual preferences, either a utility function uP or a total order P , for each protein P .
External Aggregation: Examine individual preferences and derive the global preference, which
is similarly a utility function or a total order.
We assume that the internal aggregation might be subject to errors, but not in presence or
scope such that they might deem any individual preference “more representative” than another.
Errors are small and covert. This idea is formalized by the anonymity requirement (Axiom 4.5) for
the external aggregation.
4 External Aggregation
In this section we will axiomatize the requirements of the external aggregation procedure. We
discuss the general problem structure on Sec. 4.1, followed by an axiomatic formulation of the basic
requirements on Sec. 4.2. We finally show that the external aggregation (axiomatized as below) is
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subject to fundamental impossibility results studied in the context of voting theory regardless of:
(1) the function e; and (2) the utility function uP or the total order P for any protein P .
In other words, the strategy outlined above, in the end of Sec. 3, will pose some fundamental
methodological limitations regardless on how the internal aggregation is defined – how distances,
contact, physiochemical potentials, as well how preferences are extracted. Specific axioms and
impossibility theorems for the case with ordinal preference is presented on Sec. 4.3, and for the case
with utility preference on Sec. 4.4.
4.1 Basic Notation
The external aggregation is defined as follows. Consider all interaction classes I = {I1, . . . , I380},
and arbitrary n proteins P = {P1, . . . , Pn}, with some finite n ≥ 2. Considering our two preference
models:
• In the ordinal preference setting, the individual preference of Pi is a total order i over I. By
definition, these relations are total (Ia i Ib or Ib i Ia for any Ia, Ib), transitive (if Ia i Ib
and Ib i Ic then Ia i Ic), and antisymmetric (Ia i Ib and Ib i Ia implies Ia =i Ib).
• In the utility preference setting, the individual preference of Pi is a utility function ui : I → R.
The utilities imply a total order (if ui(Ia) ≤ ui(Ib) then Ia i Ib).
The individual preference manifested by protein Pi is denoted as I(i). The preference profile
is composed of all individual preferences: I = (I(0), . . . , I(n)). Finally, the universe of preference
profiles is composed of all preference profiles: I∗ = {I : I is a valid preference profile}. The external
aggregation procedure returns a global preference, either a total order O or a utility function uO
over I. We consider the two cases separately.
In terms of notation, for any individual or the global preference X, if Ia  Ib in X, we write
Ia X Ib (and similarly for other relations). So, if Ia  Ib in I(i), we write Ia I(i) Ib; besides, if
Ia  Ib in O, we write Ia O Ib. For any two preferences X and Y , if Ia X Ib ⇔ Ia Y Ib, then
we write SameOrder(X,Y, Ia ∼ Ib).
4.2 General Axioms
Our first axioms simply models the requirement that the procedure receives multiple individual
preferences and produces a single global preference. Individual preferences are transitive ordering
over interaction classes.
Axiom 4.1. Agreement After the external aggregation, we obtain a single global preference among
interaction classes.
Axiom 4.2. Transitivity The individual preferences as well as the global preference are total
transitive orderings over interaction classes.
The unrestricted domain requirement, stated below, is an imposition on the external aggrega-
tion, not on the actual preference profile. Intuitively speaking, the external aggregation must be
able to handle arbitrary transitive individual preferences.
Axiom 4.3. Unrestricted Domain Any total order among interaction classes is permitted in a
preference profile.
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If any set of at least three interaction classes S = {I1, I2, I3} is such that both (1) Ii  Ij and
(2) Ij  Ii are possible preferences in the preference profile, for any 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 3, S is called a
3-unrestricted preference set.
In a first glance, Axiom 4.3 may appear overly imposing for practical purposes. After all, the
preference profile expressed in the PDB, given a suitable internal aggregation procedure, can be
more restrictive. However, it seems reasonable to expect a 3-unrestricted preference set in the
preference profile after the internal aggregation. In that case, the Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem
(Theorem 4.14) is applicable, and May’s Theorem (Theorem 4.15) may imply the possibility of
breaking transitivity (discussed ahead). Even considering the much less restrictive condition of
having only a 3-unrestricted preference set in the preference profile, the results apply. We keep the
complete unrestricted domain axiom for its generality appeal.
The unanimity requirement requires that if all proteins expose a preference on a particular
interaction class over another, the unanimity should be respected.
Axiom 4.4. Unanimity. For any I ∈ I∗, if SameOrder(I(i), I(j), Ia ∼ Ib) for all Pi, Pj then
SameOrder(I(i),O, Ia ∼ Ib) for all Pi, considering arbitrary Ia, Ib;
We assume that proteins manifest preferences over interaction classes in an indistinguishable
manner; i.e., we cannot infer whether protein A manifests a “better” individual preference than
protein B. As mentioned before, we assume that the internal aggregation might be subject to
errors, but not in presence or scope such that they might deem any individual preference “more
representative” than another. Errors are small and covert. In specific terms, the preferences
manifested by protein A and those by protein B are considered without regard to their identity.
Axiom 4.5. Anonymity. For any I′, I′′ ∈ I∗, whenever I′ = (I(0)′, . . . , I(n)′) is a permutation of
I
′′ = (I(0)′′, . . . , I(n)′′), we have that O′ = O′′.
We note that anonymity implicates in non-dictatorship, i.e., the fact that no individual prefer-
ence completely and exclusively defines the global preference.
Axiom 4.6. Non-Dictatorship. For all Pi ∈ P there exists at least one I ∈ I
∗ and elements
Ia, Ib such that Ia ≻I(i) Ib but Ia O Ib.
4.3 Ordinal Preference Model
Our external aggregation procedure is modeled after social welfare functions, a basic concept
in social choice theory, simply representing a procedure that receives total orders on elements of
I and produces a total order over elements of I. We start with basic axioms meaningful for the
ordinal preference model, followed by impossibility results.
4.3.1 Axioms
The neutrality requirement, formalized below, basically requires that all pairwise preferences
over interaction classes are treated equally: the procedure computing the outcome of all pairwise
preferences is oblivious to the particular names of interaction classes. We say that two preference
profiles are compatible whenever they have the same number of individual preferences.
Axiom 4.7. Neutrality. For any compatible (I′, I′′) and corresponding outputs (O′,O′′), if we
have [∀Pi ea I(i)′ eb ⇔ ec I(i)′′ ed] then ea O′ eb ⇔ ec O′′ ed, considering arbitrary ea, eb, ec, ed;
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If we make ec = ea and ed = eb, neutrality implies the famous and controversial Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). This requirement basically says that for any two aggregation scenarios
where individual preferences over arbitrary elements ea and eb remain identical, the algorithm
output similarly remains identical over those elements.
Axiom 4.8. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). For any compatible I′, I′′ ∈ I∗
and corresponding outputs O′,O′′, if we have [∀Pi SameOrder(I(i)
′, I(i)′′, ea ∼ eb)] then we have
SameOrder(O′,O′′, ea ∼ eb), considering arbitrary ea, eb;
Intuitively speaking, we want an aggregation procedure that behaves similarly to continuous
functions in the following sense: small changes in the preference profile will not induce substantial
changes in the global preference. We formalize this requirement using distance metrics. We first
define a distance metric d : I∗ × I∗ → R, which naturally satisfies the following:
1. d(X,X) = 0
2. d(X,X ′) = d(X ′,X)
3. d(X,X ′′) ≤ d(X,X ′) + d(X ′,X ′′)
for any X,X ′ ∈ I∗. Then, between two compatible preference profiles I′, I′′, we define
D =
∑
i∈{1,...,n}
d(I(i), I(i)′).
Technically, we want smaller changes in the preference profile to produce smaller changes in the
global preference, where changes are measured according to the distance function. The motivation
is having an external aggregation that is robust to small imprecision in the internal aggregation.
Formally:
Axiom 4.9. Proximity Preservation. There exists a distance function d over I∗ such that
D(I, I′) ≤ D(I, I′′)⇒ d(O,O′) ≤ d(O,O′′).
We want an external aggregation that responds positively (or at least monotonically) to the
preferences of the proteins. We want that positive changes on the preference of I1 over I2, say, due
to improving our internal aggregation, induce positive (or at least monotonic) changes in the global
order. The two axioms are presented below.
Axiom 4.10. Positive Responsiveness. For any I′, I′′ ∈ I∗ and corresponding outputs O′,O′′,
if SameOrder(I(i)′, I(i)′′, ea ∼ eb) for all i 6= j, and, for some j
1. ea ≺I(j)′ eb ⇒ ea I(j)′′ eb;
2. ea =I(j)′ eb ⇒ ea ≻I(j)′′ eb,
then ea O′ eb ⇒ ea ≻O′′ eb, considering arbitrary ea, eb.
Axiom 4.11. Monotonic Responsiveness. For any I′, I′′ ∈ I∗ and corresponding outputs O′,O′′,
if SameOrder(I(i)′, I(i)′′, ea ∼ eb) for all i 6= j, and, for some j
1. ea ≺I(j)′ eb ⇒ ea I(j)′′ eb;
2. ea =I(j)′ eb ⇒ ea ≻I(j)′′ eb,
then ea O′ eb ⇒ ea O′′ eb, considering arbitrary ea, eb.
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4.3.2 Impossibility Results
In this section, we romp through impossibility results from social choice theory and expose
contradictions hidden in our previous axioms. First, considering the results from [5], we conclude
that any external aggregation procedure that respects unanimity and satisfies anonymity does not
preserve proximity.
Theorem 4.12. No external aggregation can simultaneously respect Axioms 4.4, 4.5, 4.9.
Proof. Proof in [5].
Theorem 4.12 exposes a methodological difficulty: an external aggregation procedure that re-
spects anonymity and unanimity does not preserve proximity, which goes against the intuition that
smaller changes in the preference profile should imply in smaller changes in the global preference.
Note that the theorem in [5] is valid even when the unrestricted domain axiom is not considered.
However, if we waive proximity preservation (hence keeping unanimity and anonymity), having an
unrestricted domain still frustrates our requirements, as we conflict with neutrality:
Corollary 4.13. No external aggregation can simultaneously respect Axioms 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.7.
Proof. Since anonymity implicates in non-dictatorship and neutrality implicates in the IIA, this is
a corollary of the Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem [3].
The famous Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem [3] is widely considered as a landmark of modern
social choice theory. There exist many proofs for such result (including [3, 6, 10]). The original
theorem is presented below. Note that even relaxing anonymity to non-dictatorship, and neutrality
to the IIA, the original theorem applies:
Theorem 4.14 (Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem). No external aggregation (modeled after social
welfare functions) can simultaneously respect Axioms 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.6, 4.8.
Proof. Proof in [3].
If we want a positively responsive aggregation procedure (i.e., respecting axiom 4.10), May’s
Theorem [12] says that the preference regarding each pairwise comparison among interaction classes
is necessarily decided by simple majority. For any interaction classes Ia, Ib ∈ I, define
N(Ia > Ib) = |{Pi : Ia ≻I(i) Ib}|.
Theorem 4.15 (May’s Theorem). For each interaction class (Ia, Ib), any decision function
2 re-
specting Axioms 4.4, 4.7, and 4.10 is such that Ia O Ib ⇔ [N(Ia > Ib) ≥ N(Ib > Ia)].
The problem implied by May’s Theorem is that the global preference might be intransitive
[6, 4] if a 3-unrestricted preference set exists in the preference profile (which seems reasonable after
the internal aggregation). In fact, even waiving neutrality (preserving just the IIA) conflicts with
positive responsiveness ([4], chap. 22), so perhaps the problem is the positive responsiveness itself.
Settling for monotonicity (Axiom 4.11) works around May’s theorem, but then we could argue
whether waiving neutrality (preserving just the IIA) is reasonable or not.
2For us, external aggregation procedure.
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At first, it sounds reasonable to treat preferences consistently across different interaction classes
(as suggested by neutrality and by the IIA). As implied above, restrictions like neutrality (and its
weaker restriction, the IIA), even with seemingly natural meaning, have strong axiomatic implica-
tions. Nevertheless, dropping neutrality poses serious methodological difficulties for our strategy:
in that case, names of interaction classes matter for our external aggregation. Their relationship
and place, however, are precisely our unknowns.
Many impossibility theorems in the voting theory literature presume unrestricted domains (or
simply a 3-unrestricted preference set). For the Arrow’s Theorem as well as the May’s Theorem,
performing suitable domain restrictions, where we limit the preference profile, might be enough to
overcome the theoretical impossibilities. If preferences are single-peaked or quasi-transitive (please
refer to [16, 15]), we also dodge from the impossibility results above. We invite the reader to
appreciate these previous results and understand the relevance of these theorems for problems
related to protein folding, and perhaps in other similar contexts where a 2-step preference model
is similarly suitable.
4.4 Utility Preference Model
In this section, we discuss the utility preference model. In this setting, it is possible to obtain
utility values associated with each interaction class in each individual protein. In other words, for
any protein Pi, there exists a utility function ui mapping interaction classes to utility values. Recall
that we intend to analyze preferences manifested by individual proteins in an individual setting, and
then make an external aggregation. We presume utility functions that are not comparable across
proteins. In the following subsection, we improve the comparability and explore the consequences.
For now, we technically assume that the utility function for P differ in origin and scale from
the utility function for Q, taking any proteins P 6= Q. Formally:
Axiom 4.16. Any utility function is a strictly increasing linear transformation of another utility
function: uP = αpquQ + βpq for some αpq > 0 and any βpq, considering any proteins P and Q.
Borrowing terminology from voting theory, there is no interpersonal comparisons of utility
levels or of gains and losses among different individual preferences. Note that this is fundamentally
different from the approach where there is free comparison among utility levels (energy scores)
measured across different proteins, as seen in [11, 17, 13].
With that in mind, we are still going to consider ordinal preferences, however expressed through
utility functions, in a continuous manner. Consider the space R380+ where the i-th coordinate of an
arbitrary point p is represented by p[i]. A point p an expression descriptor for interaction classes:
p is such that the bigger the p[i], the bigger the associated expression for the interaction class Ii.
Furthermore, for sufficiently close levels of expression descriptors (i.e., points in R380+ ), the utility
function has sufficiently close values. Formally, we define
UP (p) =
∑
I1...I380
uP (Ii) · p[i],
representing the utility associated with some point p. Technically, UP is a utility function over the
expression descriptor space. Note that UP is linear, implying that the expression of I1 is worth
uP (I1)/uP (I2) times the expression of I2 for any interaction classes I1 and I2 and protein P .
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Of course, this informational framework is subject to the same impossibility results as before, but
other interesting results further apply. We now briefly overview the approach of [7, 14], describing
an impossibility result that mirrors (in the continuous setting) Theorem 4.12.
The indifference hyperplane HcP is the hyperplane containing points p where UP (p) = c. Note
that HcP and H
d
P are parallel for any positive constants c and d. The unit vector perpendicular to
HcP (for an arbitrary constant c > 0), called vP , represents the direction where the utility increases
for P . The length of the vector is disconsidered precisely because we are taking a purely ordinal
interpretation of the utility functions: their origin and scale are not comparable among different
proteins.
The individual preference for P , denoted by vP , is a unit vector indicating the direction that
maximizes UP . Note that vP denotes a unique point in the 380-dimensional sphere S
380. The
global preference, denoted by vO, and is also a unit vector indicating the direction that maximizes
the global utility. The external aggregation is such that
E : S380 × . . .× S380︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
→ S380,
where E satisfies the following:
Axiom 4.17. Continuity. The external aggregation E is a continuous function.
The anonymity and unanimity, central requirements for our aggregate mechanism, are rephrased
for our continuous setting below.
Axiom 4.18. Continuous unanimity. If vP = v for all proteins P , then the vO = v.
Axiom 4.19. Continuous anonymity. E(v1, . . . , vn) = E(pi(v1), . . . , pi(vn)), where pi is a per-
mutation function over individual preferences.
Theorem 4.20. No external aggregation can simultaneously respect Axioms 4.18, 4.19, and 4.17.
Proof. Follows from [7, 14].
Note how Theorem 4.20 mirrors Theorem 4.12 in the continuous setting. At first glance, it seems
that anonymity and unanimity are inherently incompatible with a notion of continuity. In fact,
the generality imposed by seemingly innocuous axioms is also fundamental to such impossibilities.
Specifically, performing domain restrictions, that is, reducing the generality of possible individual
preferences, is often sufficient to escape impossibility results (please refer to [7, 14]).
The continuity requirement models our robustness to imprecision in the internal aggregation
procedure. It parallels the proximity preservation property defined for ordinal preferences. In both
scenarios, in light of our general axioms, we have impossibility results that seriously hinder the
methodological strategy considered in this work.
4.4.1 Inter-Protein Comparison of Energy Levels
Let us now increase the comparability among utility function for different proteins. The utility
function for P differs in origin, but not in scale, from the utility function for Q, taking any proteins
P 6= Q. Formally:
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Axiom 4.21. Any utility function is a strictly increasing linear transformation of another utility
function: uP = αuQ+βPQ for some fixed and unique α > 0 and any βPQ, considering any proteins
P and Q.
Borrowing terminology from voting theory, there is no interpersonal comparisons of utility levels,
but there is comparison between gains and losses among different individual preferences, since the
scale is the same. For the utility preference model, we write SameValue(X,Y, Ia ∼ Ib) to denote
uX(Ia) = uY (Ib). Now consider the axioms below.
Utility IIA. For any compatible I′, I′′ ∈ I∗ and O′,O′′, if [∀Pi SameValue(I(i)
′, I(i)′′, ea ∼ eb)]
then we have that SameOrder(O′,O′′, ea ∼ eb), considering arbitrary ea, eb;
Strict Unanimity. For any I ∈ I∗, if SameOrder(I(i), I(j), Ia ∼ Ib) for all Pi, Pj then we have
SameOrder(I(i),O, Ia ∼ Ib) for all Pi, considering arbitrary Ia, Ib; Also, if Ia ≻I(i) Ib for an
arbitrary protein P , then Ia ≻O Ib.
Interestingly, those axioms imply that the external aggregation is the utilitarian rule [8]:
Ia O Ib ⇔
∑
P∈P
uP (Ia) ≥
∑
P∈P
uP (Ib).
In current literature [11, 17, 13], it is usual to perform a 1-step holistic analysis of the PDB in
order to infer a certain conclusion. Social choice theory can provide interesting characterizations
and consequences for different levels of comparability of preferences, or whichever concept maps
suitably (e.g energy scores).
5 Discussion and Final Remarks
In this work we hope to have illustrated the application and relevance of social choice theory not
only to the problem and methodology that intends to infer biases in the UEF, but to other problems
related to protein folding where the 2-step approach makes sense. We particularly think that the
2-step approach is sensible in light of Anfinsen’s thermodynamic hypothesis, as if stable folds are
the result solely of a protein’s individual aminoacid sequence, considering the PDB holistically may
not be always desirable.
Note that the problem considered in this work is formally weaker than those aiming for more
complete characterizations of the UEF with our 2-step approach and the same axiomatic setting.
Stronger characterizations of the UEF via the method above will suffer from similar methodological
limitations unless axioms are relaxed, made more specific, or otherwise changed appropriately.
Many impossibility results highlighted here rely on the generality of the axioms. Our axioms
specify, for instance, that any possible individual preference is valid. While this is attractive in an
axiomatic setting, it is necessary to the Arrow’s Impossibility Result and implies possibly breaking
transitivity in light of May’s Theorem. However, those conditions can be avoided. In some cases
(such as for Corollary 4.13 and Theorem 4.20), a suitable domain restriction, which disallows
some particular individual preferences, avoid the issues (please refer to [6, 7]). If preferences are
single-peaked or quasi-transitive, we also dodge from the impossibility results above (please refer
to [16, 15]). Given the considerations here, we invite the reader to appreciate these previous results
and understand their relevance for algorithm design – not only in the context of protein folding with
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the thermodynamic hypothesis, but perhaps in other similar contexts where a 2-step aggregation
procedure is similarly suitable. The social choice literature is vast – and we urge the community of
computer scientists to investigate these results and their possibly immense connection and relevance
to problems involving protein folding.
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